BOOK REVIEWS

DMITRY A. OLSHANSKY

FROM HEIDEGGER TO HEIDEGGER AND BEYOND: AN EXPERIENCE OF INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY


It is difficult task to review such a fundamental work, because it is more impressive than any critical judgment. As we can learn, William John Richardson’s book is one of the most frequently cited works on Heidegger in any language. I can add that it is one of the most complete and circumstantial investigations of Heidegger’s ideas as well. Even the task of such comprehensive investigation of Heidegger’s philosophy is estimable; furthermore, even an 800-page (originally, 1100-page) well-written volume deserves homage of all serious researchers of phenomenology. His scrupulous work and attention to the paltry details have made this book a recognized nonesuch of history of philosophy.

Heidegger is known to be a man of varied attainment; his interests were vast and his talents were not expressed in fundamental ontology only – as William Richardson noted – hence, there is no sole scheme for how to dissert his ideas. Heidegger wrote poems in
his youth [the author quoted one of them at p. 1], and had interests in religious ideas (not only Catholicism in earlier period, but also Lutheranism and Buddhism). Not mention confession, in any case, “Heidegger’s critique has genuinely theological origins”.¹ According to Heidegger, “holy is equivalent of Being and poetry analogous to thought.” [p. 431]. Therefore, a serious researcher could not ignore his literary works that should be analyzed in context of his philosophy. It is too hard to consider all the faces of his genius and to synthesize a unified and complete investigation; therefore Richardson formulates and analyses “the essentials of his entire problematic.” [p. XLI].

But what is this problematic? To answer this question, it is necessary to trace a strategy of the author, because his very aim defines a path of reading and interpretation. Richardson’s book is known to be a classical example of history of philosophy, but it is not restricted by historical methodology. Many historic-philosophical works go into history rather than into philosophy, and often these works appear to be a biography and a bibliography in twain. Richardson prefers to show an intellectual progress of Heidegger’s thought; against such background his book appears as a rather philosophical example of historic-philosophical investigation. For that reason he does not discuss Heidegger’s ideas and add nothing, and he fully follows the letter of the original text. Of course, these qualities witness the high academic level of Richardson’s research.

He also shares another academic principle of investigation, because, to create an accomplished research, one should deny some seductions: to avoid the topics that are interesting, but not main.

Therefore the author balks at adjacent themes, which are important, but foreign to the matter at hand. In such a way (1) he does not retell the philosopher’s biography, which should be the matter of special investigation; and we have already known such works.² Though the author notes the key landmarks in Heidegger’s life, biography and historical context are not his main aims. (2) He does not analyze post-heideggerian philosophy (French and German, pas excellence)³ and does not view Heidegger’s influence over many branches of recent philosophy as well. He quotes merely Levinas’s essay of 1949 “En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger”.⁴ There is not one serious

philosopher of the second half of the XX-th century, who does not experience an influence of Heidegger. Eventually, (3) the author does not trace intellectual relations between Heidegger and his coevals, colleagues and disciples\(^5\) (E. Jünger, K. Barth, M. Scheler, K. Jaspers – who also used the terms Dasein, but in different meaning – and many others). These are not failings of Richardson’s investigation, but the result of the peculiar academic strategy of the author. But it seems that the author is captured by a textual analysis, which predominates over reflection on original texts.

According to academic tradition, Richardson pays attention to analysis of previous philosophy, which were the sources for Heidegger’s own thoughts. To analyze a philosopher at length one should research the tradition and her/his predecessors. But how could one learn which previous authors, philosophical traditions and coevals were useful for Heidegger and which were secondary? Richardson devoted more than 100 pages to inquiry about Heidegger’s predecessors in the question of being from Ancient Greece to the XX-th century. He devoted special chapters both to the philosophers Heraclitus [pp. 484 – 489; 490 – 501], Parmenides [pp. 269 – 272; 597 – 607], Plato [pp. 301 – 308], Aristotle [pp. 309 – 320], Descartes [pp. 321 – 330], Kant (and problem of metaphysics) [pp. 106 – 160], Hegel [pp. 331 – 360], Nietzsche [pp. 361 – 382; 434 – 439], and the poets Hölderlin [pp. 403 – 417; 440 – 472] and Rilke [pp. 391 – 400]. Beyond controversy these authors were basic for Heidegger, but why did Richardson suppose Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, F. Schleiermacher, A. Schopenhauer, K. Marx or W. Dilthey to be secondary thinkers for Heidegger? Richardson also overlooked Heidegger’s borrowing from Y. von Wartenburg, his polemics of 1920 with H. Rickert and W. Windelband on the problem of “a priori” and disappearance of a real man, his correspondence with Blochmann on the Faith in a crucified God.\(^6\) Also his intellectual relations with his friend K. Jaspers and G. Bataille, whom he called the “keenest philosopher of France”, his answer to Levinas’s critiques, and his interest in contemporary German poetry. The author can ignore all post-heideggerian tradition, because it follows Heidegger, but why does Richardson not analyze the correlation with the adjacent philosophical traditions: analytic philosophy in Wittgenstein and Ryle, existentialism in Marcel and Merleau-Ponty. The author just quotes the title of his “Les Philosophes Célèbres” [p. 626]. Eventually, why the author ignores an influence of religious tradition like Buddhism at all. I think that religious aspects of Heidegger’s thoughts are also not main for the history of philosophy, but a comprehensive research could not dispense with Heidegger’s turn from Catholic philosophy to Protestantism, and the influence of medieval mystics and Oriental religious doctrines. All of these questions witness that Richardson’s well-written analysis of Heidegger is too selective and conventional: he generalizes a lot of important information and sets it forth accessibly, but adds very few new themes and views to the classical reading of Heidegger. He continues the previous tradition and methods of analysis of Heidegger, and this is a positive aspect of Richardson’s monograph.

Secondly, according to academic principles, he pays great attention to the development of conceptual apparatus, and even puts in an English-German glossary and

\(^5\) Among his disciples were also H. Arendt, L. Binswanger, H.-G. Gadamer, E. Fink, K. Löwith, H. Marcuse, R. Bultmann and many others. Even R. Rorty considered Heidegger to be one of the most important authors for his own philosophy.

an index of key Greek terms. Richardson observes the appearance and development of many terms in Heidegger like *Dasein*, *in-der-Welt-Sein* (being-in-the-world)\(^7\) [p. 48, 99], *Das Man* (people) [p. 79 – 80], *Gesammeltes Anwesen* (coming-to-presence), *Einbildungskraft* (imagination) [p. 121 – 124], and many others. To understand the transitions in Heidegger’s philosophy Richardson not only carefully examines the meaning of these terms, but also traces the progress of these concepts from “*Sein und Zeit*” to his later works. But at the same time he does not pay necessary attention to the terms that both were important for Heidegger and were evolved in post-heideggerian philosophy such as *Destruktion*\(^8\) (or *Abbau* in Husserl), *Leben* (human life), *Situation*, – that were borrowed by Heidegger from previous tradition, mainly from Husserl, Nietzsche and Jaspers, – and *Differenz*\(^9\) (difference) [pp. 578 – 581], *Tod* (death) [p. 573 – 574], *Spur* (trace)\(^10\) [p. 632] that exerted an influence on many recent thinkers: Levinas has used the term “trace” as a synonym of the Face of the Other, Derrida has borrowed Heidegger’s “trace” as a definition of meaning that does not exist in text, and Kristeva has adopted this term to psychoanalysis and has used it as a definition of the unconscious acts. Not to mention the amplification of the term “difference”: from P. de Man and P. Ricoeur to G. Deleuze and J. Derrida. Heidegger is a fare-famed philosopher, therefore we can find both political\(^11\)

---


\(^10\) Richardson translates Heidegger’s *Spur* as a “course”. Such a translation betoken the author’s disregard to French post-heideggerian tradition, where *Spur* (*le trace*) has become one of the basic terms in reading and interpretation of Heidegger. Some authors consider post-modern ethics to emanate from Heidegger, see: Hodge J. *Genealogy for the postmodern ethics: reflection on Hegel and Heidegger in “Shadow of Spirit: The Religious Sub-text of Contemporary Western Thought*”. Ed. by Philippa Berry and Andrew Wernick. London: Routledge, 1993. – pp. 135 – 148; A majority of researcher share the opinion about the closest relations between post-heideggerian philosophy and postmodern ethics, see: Critchley S. *The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992; 1999.


and religious\textsuperscript{12} application of his ideas and interpretations by feminists\textsuperscript{13}, art critics\textsuperscript{14}, social and practical philosophers,\textsuperscript{15} and even postmodernists\textsuperscript{16}. Of course, a historian of philosophy should not follow any original way of reading, but s/he has to appreciate the necessity of all the interpretations. Together with postmodern reading of Heidegger there are a lot of academic historic-philosophical researchers in France. I should name just the 4-volume investigation of Heidegger by Jean Beaufret “Dialogue avec Heidegger” (1973 – 1985)\textsuperscript{17} and Didier Franck’s\textsuperscript{18} book. Richardson does not pay necessary attention to


French and German academic literature on Heidegger that should be useful for his own research.

Richardson considers these terms to be inessential, therefore he mentions some of these terms at a glimpse. It seems to me that the difference between Leben and Dasein is important, and one of the obscure themes in reading of “Sein und Zeit”. It is known that Heidegger sympathizes with the philosophy of life-force and was going to entitle his book as Leben und Zeit. This is to clarify why I consider an analysis of Leben in Heidegger to be topical. But Richardson notes only the connection between life-force and subjectivism in Descartes [p. 327] and traces the development of this term in Schopenhauer [p. 363] and in connection with Nietzsche’s Wille zum Willen [pp. 364 – 370]. At the same time the author avoids an analysis of Leben in earlier Heidegger. We can find a critic of philosophy of life-force even in § 10 of his “Sein und Zeit”, where he argues that life is just a sort of being: “Leben ist ein eigene Seinsart, aber wesenhaft nur zugänglich im Dasein”.

Dasein and Leben are known to be synonymous in common German: Darwin’s concept “struggle for life” is usually translated into German as “Kampf ums Dasein”. But we can learn that Heidegger differentiated one from the other. He used the word Daßsein for the first time in his lectures Einleitung in die Phänomenologie de Religion (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion) [1920] and Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus (Augustine and Neoplatonism) [1921]. Already in Einleitung in die Phänomenologie de Religion he distinguished these terms. And in 1923 Heidegger finally formulated the difference between man’s life and Dasein, which previously were used as synonyms. Since that time Dasein was used as a new term, and it replaced the term Leben. Of course, the history of appearance and development of the term Dasein both in German philosophy and in Heidegger particularly should be analyzed more circumstantially, and I assume that no investigation could embrace all the details and satisfy all the particularities. Besides, this question seems to be collateral, and general review of Heidegger’s thought should go without this problem. Nevertheless Richardson carefully describes the meaning of Dasein according to “Sein und Zeit” and keeps track of this term in subsequent works. In my opinion, the author’s inattention to the concept of Leben in Heidegger witnesses to a more profound problem.

One of Richardson’s basic ideas is the difference between Heidegger I and Heidegger II. For a professional reader of Heidegger it is obvious that his earlier works differ from later ones; and this differentiation was pointed out in all the textbooks and was poached by many later researchers. There are a lot of thinkers whose earlier works excel enough from their later works. For example, in such a way we can distinguish Kant I (pre-Critical period) and Kant II (period of his three Critics that resound his name) and Wittgenstein I (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London, 1922) and Wittgenstein II (Philosophical investigations, Oxford, 1953). But unlike other thinkers, Heidegger conceded this turn himself; therefore we can insist on this idea positively. Richardson inserts as a preface to his book the letter from Heidegger, where he evaluated this

---

differentiation and noted its limits. Heidegger wrote in the Preface: “The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition that it is kept consistently in mind: only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. But the thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is contained in [Heidegger] II”. [p. XXII]. Heidegger also left behind some texts of self-analysis and interviews on his own philosophy and life, which could be unvalued matter for history of philosophy.\footnote{Heidegger M. Heidegger on Heidegger.// Die Zeit, September 24, 10; [2] Heidegger M. Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten: Spiegel-Gespräch mit Martin Heidegger am 23. September 1966.// Der Spiegel, May 31, 1976. – pp. 193 – 219.}

Heidegger also mentioned there a perspective of history of philosophy and marked the main ways of researching a philosophy of Heidegger.

In respect to that notion, Richardson maintains the possibility of this demarcation. In spite of the fact that we can find so many differences between earlier and later texts, the author keeps the same, and his topics, methods and interests also remain. “Heidegger I and Heidegger II are not the same (das Gleiche) – but they are one (das Selbe).” [p. 625].

According to Foucault, an author is an institute that assists to gather the texts and create a history of their development and succession. And Richardson keeps the rules of classical thinking and tries to create a sequence of Heidegger I and Heidegger II. “They belong to each other in profound identity”. [p. 628]. He calls this sequence a movement from phenomenology to thought. That is the history of Heidegger’s works and methods, which Richardson proposes.

The main conclusion of Richardson’s historic-philosophical research on Heidegger’s methods is based on differentiation of his earlier and later methods: “The method characteristic of Heidegger II is the process of thought, of Heidegger I the process of phenomenology” [p. 623]. This idea seems to define the subtitle of the book “Through Phenomenology to Thought”. But at the same time he aims to create a consequent history of Heidegger’s ideas and to show that there was no gulf between Heidegger I and Heidegger II, but to analyze the very turn in Heidegger’s method. And this strategy has both promising and disputable results.

I should mark one bare deficit, which, of course, could not ruin my positive feeling of this book. It seems to me that William Richardson ignores earlier works by Heidegger, when he begins his book with analysis of “Sein und Zeit”; that was published in 1927, when Heidegger was already 38 years old. Assuredly “Sein und Zeit” was the serious and original (and the most famous) of Heidegger’s works, but it was not “the first step” [p. 211], as Richardson maintains. This book was the result of a certain way in philosophy; in Richardson it looks like the beginning of the way. No one thinker could suddenly begin her/his way with the most serious and deep work that s/he ever writes. In reading “Sein und Zeit” we deal with well-educated and evolved ontology, but Richardson did not trace the way of development of earlier Heidegger (before 1927). By this reason, the author overlooked religious aspects, which were important in Heidegger’s earlier writings. This is obvious in his Freiburg lectures \textit{Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens} [1919] and writings of 1920-th. Even Heidegger in 1921 named himself as a theologian.\footnote{See letter to Löwith August 19, 1921 in Löwith K. Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism. Transl. by Gary Steiner. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. – pp. 235 – 139.} That was one more complexion of his talent. Many authors
concur that research of his earlier works could assist us to learn Heidegger as a religious thinker.

It seems to me that Richardson idealizes later Heidegger (“Heidegger of Thought”) and supposes him to be more important than his earlier works and than heideggerian phenomenology. He also detracts phenomenological methods in Heidegger’s philosophy and opposes these to the method of thought. [p. 623]. But many researchers are inclined to reckon Heidegger with phenomenology completely, and do not recognize that strange opposition. And I can agree that Heidegger never abnegated his earlier ideas and put the corrections into “Sein und Zeit” until his death in 1976; the book was re-published 9 times during Heidegger’s life. The fact is that Heidegger was a phenomenologist throughout his life, rather than a critic of phenomenology. At the same time, his position was changing and he was not one and the same philosopher from the cradle to the grave, but he was keeping previous methods and ideas rather than denying them. That is why it seems to me that Richardson pruned phenomenology down and considered it as just one possible method in Heidegger. Even Heidegger pointed out in “Preface” that Richardson has treated phenomenology in a husserlian way, not after Heidegger. [p. XIV]. Therefore my suspicions that Richardson simplifies Heidegger’s progress and reduces it to a replacement of the methods are not unfounded.

This witnesses that Richardson’s idea is not spotless, because his analysis of Heidegger’s turn is problematic enough. The author assumes that Heidegger turned from phenomenology to thought, and it sounds like phenomenology is not a thought, but like a thoughtless method. Secondly, it sounds like later Heidegger was not a phenomenologist. Such differentiation seems to be debatable, and such opposition of the terms “phenomenology” and “thought” is questionable. Heidegger also believed that the term “Thought” in the title of the book is ambiguous, because it covers both metaphysical thought and Being-question. [p. XIV]. I do not understand why Richardson prefers such a woolly word like “thought” to name a method of later Heidegger; and why he contrasts these two methods, while the last one (Heidegger II, Heidegger of thought) was an effect and continuation of the first one (Heidegger I or Heidegger of


phenomenology). And it is essential to trace the development of Heidegger’s phenomenology after the turn, and to investigate its new features and peculiarities.

It appears that Richardson does not touch the themes and ideas that were not developed after “Sein und Zeit” and investigates only that which is “contained in Heidegger I”. Therefore he explains the earlier Heidegger from the position of the later one, and his is realized backward: from thought to phenomenology. But it is not a defect of the books, because the author longs for integrity of the very manifold of Heidegger’s writings, and his strategy of reading is original and debatable but wholly admissible.

A matter of Richardson’s investigation is a famous turn (Die Kehre) in Heidegger’s method. To explore this turn, one should show both differences and affinities of the two periods. It is known that many themes were common for Heidegger I and Heidegger II. After the turn the following problems remained central for Heidegger: 1. Poetic language as e-vent [p. 535]; 2. Being as discovering (αληθεια) [pp. 549]; 3. E-vent (Ereignis) of the Being and ultimate unity [pp. 614, 638 – 639]. Philosophy of technique and poetic language became the central themes in the last years of his teaching and writing. This witnesses that Heidegger II was not uniform too, and some themes were brought to the forefront and his thought has undergone various changes. But this fact impugns the very chronology. Really, why are there just two periods in Heidegger’s writing? Or why turn was only one? If one recognizes a development, one should agree that the ideas and way of thinking renovate constantly. Of course, these questions are not so topical in reading Heidegger, but we should notice them. Richardson’s chronology is recognized by a lot of researchers (and by me too), and it is suitable enough for explanation of Heidegger’s progress. But there is another chronology of Heidegger’s writings: on the one hand, for example: 1. Earlier Heidegger and “Sein und Zeit” (1920 – 1929), 2. Rethinking of Being or Heidegger of “Was ist Metaphysik?” (1929 – 1935), 3. Heidegger of “Beiträge zur Philosophie”, which was published even in 1989 (1935 – 1947), 4. Heidegger of research language and contemporary poetry (1947 – 1976). On the other hand, R. Schürmann differentiates three periods of Heidegger’s writings. Richardson proposes classical chronology, – and I respect his idea and share such differentiation, – but unfortunately he does not critique other chronologies.

Why are other chronologies inconvenient for Richardson? – Because his investigation covers just a short period of Heidegger’s writing: from 1927 to 1952. The author stops his investigation with the Heidegger works of 1952 – although he wrote until 1967, and some of his manuscripts were published long after his death – and with secondary sources of 1961 and a bibliography of 1968. So he ignores both some original texts and a lot of secondary matters. There is no point in reciting all the titles that were


written on Heidegger during the last 43 years in many languages, and Richardson agrees that he left out a lot of quality secondary literature, regretfully. [p. 693]. Really secondary literature could not make Richardson change his opinion for several reasons: first of all, because his book is a classic and it has already become a manual for many researchers; secondly, because the author based his book on original literature; thirdly, because the author has his own method and well-grounded point of view. But his method consists of using original texts, and therefore he does not concentrate attention upon new secondary literature at all. This is not a reproach of Richardson’s research, but is a sequence of his method.

Really, the author did not use the literature on Heidegger written in the last 30 years; that is why the fourth edition does not renovate and supplement Richardson’s research, but copies no less wonderful previous editions. The circle of secondary literature is not wide enough for such a respectable volume and it answers to the year 1963, when it was published for the first time. The preface by Heidegger and Writer’s preface was written in 1962. Writer’s preface to the third edition was written in 1973, and the epilogue was written in 1976 after Heidegger’s death and was published in Man and World, No. 10 (1977). But they do not renovate Richardson’s view on Heidegger and add nothing to the text of 1963. The fourth edition of the book does not differ substantially from the previous three editions, except that the author’s preface to the U.S. edition was written and published in Heidegger Studies 13 in 1997 [pp. 17 – 28], where the writer continues the same idea of differentiation between Heidegger I and Heidegger II. Here he uses the new original text “Contribution to Philosophy”\(^27\), published in English in 1999, but it changes nothing in Richardson’s opinion, because he quotes just one secondary book, published after 1962\(^28\), and basically uses the same critics (A. De Waehlens [1941], M. Müller [1958], H. Birault [1950], E. Levinas [1949]) [p. XXXIV], keeps the same point of view and puts in the same quotations from Heidegger and his own book.

As I noted above, the author also does not take into consideration earlier works of Heidegger, and he ignores some of his latest writings. In the same way as Richardson lost the first 15 years of Heidegger’s earlier writing (1912 – 1927) and cut the last 15 years of his writings (1952 – 1967), so he ignores altogether more than 62 years of Heidegger’s life (1889 – 1927 and 1952 – 1976). So, just 25 years come into Richardson’s sight. That is why he seems to investigate the period of Die Kehre only, therefore I could not call the book “Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought” a complete investigation of all Heidegger’s writings. But this fact does not detract from Richardson’s merits; his book is the sole scrupulous and comprehensive research of Heidegger’s Die Kehre.

Eventually, the book was published for the first time when Heidegger was still alive, and was reprinted 4 times with a new preface. But it seems that none addition were entered since that time. The author just eked the bibliography out by the new secondary sources, published from 1962 until 1972, but did not use them. Therefore I can conclude that this is an excellent book that fits the bill of the year 1963. Heidegger and


phenomenology seems to be of Richardson’s distant interest; at present he is also known to be psychoanalysis and the author of the books on lacanian psychoanalysis. His main contemporary interests are not connect with Heidegger, therefore it is too heavy to find any novelty in forth edition of the book. Therefore I can conclude that the book “Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought” was the authoritative result of Richardson’s interest in Heidegger of 1960-th years.

Although this book is not indisputable, it is very important for history of philosophy and for academic research of Heidegger. In any case, fourth edition of this classical book is an important event in history of philosophy. And I appreciate re-printing of this volume very much.